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 Although the struggle over teaching evolution in the public schools 
has never been far from the front pages of the nation’s newspapers ever 
since John Scopes was convicted of teaching the theory in 1925,1 the 
controversy has recently ascended to new heights.2  In late 2004, the school 
board of the Dover School District in Pennsylvania passed a series of 
measures requiring teachers to inform students that evolution is incomplete 
and to make available to students a textbook on “intelligent design” (“ID”), a 
purportedly scientific theory suggesting that an intelligent agent created the 
universe and everything in it, including human beings.3  Soon after the school 
board took these actions, the ACLU of Pennsylvania sued in federal district 
court to enjoin the school’s policies.4  The school board has refused to back 
down from its position, and a trial is expected to begin later this year.5  Thus 
it would appear that nearly a decade after ID theory first emerged as a major 
weapon for evolution opponents, the courts will be called upon to evaluate 
                                                 
* Associate Professor, Boston University School of Law.  The author thanks Jack Beermann, 
Ward Farnsworth, Bill Marshall, Trevor Morrison, and Kate Silbaugh for extremely helpful 
comments on an earlier draft. 
1 For a short history of the controversy over teaching evolution, see Jay D. Wexler, Note, Of 
Pandas, People, and the First Amendment: The Constitutionality of Teaching Intelligent Design in the 
Public Schools, 49 STAN. L. REV. 439, 444-52 (1997). 
2 For a selection of recent accounts of the controversy in the mainstream press, see, e.g., 
Claudia Wallis, The Evolution Wars, TIME, August 15, 2005, at 26 (discussing, among other 
things, President Bush’s recent support for discussing intelligent design in public school 
classrooms); H. Allen Orr, Master Planned: Why Intelligent Design Isn’t, THE NEW YORKER, May 
30, 2005; Editorial, The Evolution of Creationism, THE NEW YORK TIMES, May 17, 2005, at 
A20; Lawrence M. Krauss, School Boards Want to Teach the ‘Controversy’; What Controversy?, THE 
NEW YORK TIMES, May 17, 2005, at F5; Peter Slevin, Teachers, Scientists Vow to Fight Challenge 
to Evolution, WASH. POST, May 5, 2005, at A3.  
3 See John Riley, A Matter of Intelligent Design: A Pennsylvania School Board Is at the Center of a 
Controversial Approach to Teaching Creation as an Alternative to Evolution, NEWSDAY, Jan. 14, 2005, 
at A10.  Practitioners of ID generally do not specify the specific identity of the intelligent 
designer, and they do not describe the designer in Christian, Biblical, or other traditional 
religious terms.  For more on the theory, see, e.g., Wexler, supra n. 1, at 441-42. 
4 Id. 
5 See http://www.aclupa.org/legal/legaldocket/intelligentdesigncase.htm (indicating that a 
trial is scheduled to start in September 2005). 
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whether the public schools may teach the theory consistently with the First 
Amendment. 
 
 In a series of recent writings, including a full length book and several 
articles, Baylor University professor Francis J. Beckwith has argued that 
public schools may constitutionally teach intelligent design.6  In doing so, 
Beckwith has considered and critiqued a number of arguments I have 
previously advanced in my own writing,7 calling them “hardly persuasive,”8 
“wide of the mark,”9 “logically fallacious,”10 “patently unreasonable,”11 and 
“philosophically irrelevant.”12  In this Essay, I respond to Beckwith’s 
arguments regarding ID, both those that specifically critique my own 
arguments, as well as those that stand on their own.  I argue that many of 
Beckwith’s arguments in favor of the constitutionality of teaching ID fail, 
and that the question of whether public schools may teach the theory 
consistent with the First Amendment is far more difficult than Beckwith 
would appear to believe. 
 
                                                 
6 FRANCIS J. BECKWITH, LAW, DARWINISM, AND PUBLIC EDUCATION: THE ESTABLISHMENT 
CLAUSE AND THE CHALLENGE OF INTELLIGENT DESIGN (2003) [hereinafter “L,D & PE”]; 
Francis J. Beckwith, Public Education, Religious Establishment, and the Challenge of Intelligent Design, 
17 NOTRE DAME J. LAW, ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 461 (2003); Francis J. Beckwith, A Liberty 
Not Fully Evolved?: The Case of Rodney LeVake and the Right of Public School Teachers to Criticze 
Darwinism, 39 SAN D. L. REV. 1311 (2002); Francis J. Beckwith, Intelligent Design in the Schools: 
Is It Constitutional?, 25 CHRISTIAN RESEARCH J. #4 (2003). 
7 In addition to the Note cited in n. 1, supra, see also Jay D. Wexler, Darwin, Design, and 
Disestablishment: Teaching the Evolution Controversy in Public Schools, 56 VAND. L. REV. 751 (2003).  
A new piece on evolution—specifically the Scopes Trial—is forthcoming in the Georgetown 
Law Journal, although of course Beckwith has not commented on that particular piece.  See 
Jay D. Wexler, The Scopes Trope, 74 GEO. L. J. (forthcoming) (book review).  Beckwith and I 
debated the constitutionality of intelligent design at a Spring 2005 event sponsored by the 
Harvard Federalist Society.  For one account of that debate, see the discussion at 
http://www.pandasthumb.org/pt-archives/000974.html.   
Beckwith’s book was also the focus of a Harvard Law Review student book note, 
Book Note, Not Your Daddy’s Fundamentalism: Intelligent Design in the Classroom, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 964 (2004), which started a bit of a controversy in the blogosphere when Brian Leiter 
attacked the author as “perpetrat[ing] (intentionally or otherwise) a scholarly fraud,” and 
argued that the “book note is riddled with factual errors and misleading innuendo from start 
to finish.”  Brian Leiter, Harvard Law Review Embarrasses Itself, 
http://webapp.utexas.edu/blogs/archives/bleiter/000878.html (Mar. 10, 2004).  For more 
on this controversy, see Lawrence VanDyke, An Important Sunday Post, 
http://fedsoc.blogspot.com/2004_03_01_fedsoc_archive.html#107931360182005218 (Mar. 
14, 2004) (responding to Leiter’s critique); Hunter Baker, The Professor’s Paroxysm: A Scholar’s 
Attack on a Student Writer—and Academic Freedom, National Review Online, 
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/baker200403150909.asp (Mar. 15, 2004); Brian 
Leiter, The Denouement to the VanDyke Debate about Intelligent Design Creationism, 
http://webapp.utexas.edu/blogs/archives/bleiter/000954.html (Mar. 16, 2004).  
8 BECKWITH, L, D & PE, supra n. 6, at 151. 
9 Id. at 150. 
10 Id. at 156. 
11 Id. at 154. 
12 Id. at 156. 
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 To be sure, I do not disagree with all of Professor Beckwith’s 
positions.  Indeed, we agree on a number of important points.  For instance, 
I agree with Beckwith that courts will not get far by trying to demarcate 
scientific theories from non-scientific ones13 (though I do not think this 
matters for constitutional analysis); that it is bad policy to teach evolution 
without teaching about alternative ways of thinking about origins14 (though I 
would address this problem not by teaching intelligent design in science 
classes but by teaching about religion in stand alone comparative religion 
classes); and that ID should not be found unconstitutional simply because it 
lends support to Christianity and other monotheistic belief systems15 (though 
I think it is constitutionally problematic for other reasons).   
 
 Despite these areas of agreement, I do disagree with Beckwith’s 
ultimate conclusion that teaching ID in the public schools would likely be 
constitutional.  In my view, teaching the theory would raise significant 
problems under the First Amendment.  More specifically, I disagree with 
Beckwith in three important substantive areas, namely whether courts should 
find that ID constitutes a religious belief, whether the Court’s decision in 
Edwards v. Aguillard16 casts doubt on the constitutionality of teaching ID, and 
whether teachers have any first amendment academic freedom right to teach 
ID in direct contravention of clear school policy.  In this three-part essay I 
address these issues in turn. 
 
 
I. Is Intelligent Design a Religion? 
 
 
 Beckwith argues that ID is not a religion because it is not a 
conventional religion like Christianity or Judaism but rather a “point of view 
based on philosophical and empirical arguments,”17 one that simply provides 
answers to the same question that evolution answers, namely: “What is the 
origin of apparent design in biological organisms and/or other aspects of the 
natural universe?”18  Beckwith also argues that ID is not a religion under the 
prevailing Court of Appeals test because ID does not address fundamental 
questions, is not comprehensive in nature, and is not accompanied by formal 
or external signs (like rituals, services, clergy, holidays) that are associated 
with those belief systems generally recognized as religious.19  Beckwith’s first 
                                                 
13 See id. at 23-28; Wexler, supra n. 1, at 466-68. 
14 See BECKWITH, L, D & PE, supra n. 6, at 120-26. 
15 See id. at 149. 
16 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (holding that Louisiana’s statute requiring equal time for the teaching 
of evolution and creation science violated the Establishment Clause). 
17 Id. at 149. 
18 Id. at 150. 
19 See id. at 152-53.  The prevailing circuit court test can be found in the following cases: 
Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981) (denying a free exercise claim of a 
prisoner who belonged to an organization called MOVE); Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 207 
(3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring) (first articulating the test in a case involving 
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point is only partly true but is irrelevant in any event; his second point 
represents a correct application of a nonetheless inappropriate legal test for 
determining whether ID constitutes a religion.  ID’s status or non-status as 
religion requires a different type of analysis than the prevailing test provides, 
and thus whether the theory constitutes religion cannot be resolved by 
application of that test.  Although the question of whether ID is religion 
cannot be determined by application of any existing precedent, the better 
view is that the theory is religious in nature because it espouses a concept—
the world was designed by an intelligent creator—that is inherently religious. 
 
 Beckwith is correct, of course, to argue that ID is not a conventional 
religion like Christianity.  By its own terms, the theory of ID does not 
incorporate the corpus of any particular religious tradition; it simply makes a 
claim about the origin and design of the universe without connecting that 
claim to any particular system of belief.  Although it may be the case that 
most ID supporters are in fact Christians, and although it is certainly true 
that ID theory does lend some support to Christian beliefs, neither of these 
facts is constitutionally relevant.   
 
 Beckwith is also right when he argues that ID does not meet the 
prevailing test in the Courts of Appeals for determining whether a belief 
system constitutes a religion for First Amendment purposes.20  That test, as 
articulated by the Third and Ninth Circuits, asks whether a belief system is 
comprehensive in nature, addresses fundamental questions, and is 
accompanied by “certain formal and external signs” common to traditional 
religions, such as symbols, rituals, holidays, and clergy members.21  Beckwith 
argues that ID fails this test because it lacks these types of signs, is an isolated 
teaching rather than a comprehensive one, and does not “address 
fundamental and ultimate questions having to do with deep and 
imponderable matters.”22  Although one might posit that ID does in fact 
address fundamental questions, and although the existence of “formal and 
external signs” is not a necessary precondition for religion under the relevant 
test,23 Beckwith is on solid ground in claiming that ID fails the test because it 
is an isolated teaching rather than a comprehensive belief system. 
 
 As it turns out, however, this conclusion does not save ID from 
constitutional infirmity.  The legal test Beckwith relies upon cannot be the 
right test for determining whether ID counts as religion for First 
Amendment purposes.  If it were, then schools could encourage students to 
pray, since the concept of prayer, by itself, does not meet the three part test 
                                                                                                                                                 
transcendental meditation training in schools); Alvarado v. City of San Jose, 94 F.3d 1223 
(9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the city of San Jose could erect a sculpture of Quezacoatl, an 
Aztec God, without violating the Establishment Clause). 
20 See n. 19, supra. 
21 See, e.g., Africa, 662 F.2d at 1032; Alvarado, 94 F.3d at 1229. 
22 See BECKWITH, L, D & PE, supra n. 6, at 152. 
23 See Africa, 662 F.2d at 1032 (noting that “a religion often can be recognized by the presence 
of certain formal and external signs”). 
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either.  Likewise, if Beckwith is right, then schools could teach the truth of 
reincarnation, karma, sin, or other indisputably religious concepts, because 
none of these concepts by itself would meet the three part test.  What these 
obvious examples demonstrate is that a different test must apply when the 
question is whether some concept, practice, or belief in isolation is religious, 
as opposed to whether some broader and more integrated belief system 
constitutes a religious belief as a whole.24 
 
 The courts have not explicitly recognized this problem as of yet, but 
it seems to me that the right analysis for the question would ask whether the 
concept, practice, or belief in question sounds in religion rather than in some 
other area of intellectual inquiry, such that government promotion of the 
concept would be understood by a reasonable person as an advancement or 
endorsement of religion.  Although I will not spell out here in any great detail 
what exact questions this test would ask, it would seem that reasonable 
inquiries would include such questions as whether a reasonable person would 
associate the concept primarily with religion; whether the concept is an 
important aspect of the religious traditions that people generally know about; 
whether the concept is also prominently associated with ideas or belief 
systems that most people do not view as religious; and whether, if the 
concept is associated with non-religious belief systems, it is more 
prominently associated with those belief systems than with religious 
traditions, or vice versa? 
 
 Although this test may be somewhat circular,25 and although 
application of the test will be difficult at the margins,26 the test is in fact quite 
easy to apply in the case of ID.  Does ID sound in religion?  Does the notion 
that an intelligent designer created the world and all of its inhabitants sound 
in religion?  Sure it does.  The intelligent design of the universe is the core 
concept of the major prominent Western religions, without which those 
religious traditions would be unrecognizable.  Most reasonable people would 
                                                 
24 See Wexler, supra n. 7, at 815-17. 
25 This circularity, however, does not distinguish this test from other tests that address the 
question of what counts as “religion” for First Amendment purposes.  For example, the 
three-part Third and Ninth Circuit tests discussed above, see n. __, supra, by asking whether 
the belief system in question possesses some of the familiar “external and formal signs” of 
traditional religions, is essentially a circular inquiry: the belief system is a religion if it shares 
some of the characteristics of those things we already recognize as religious.  Likewise, the 
scholarly position that this Third Circuit test most closely resembles—the so-called 
“analogical approach” to defining religion supported by Kent Greenawalt, see Kent 
Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. L. REV. 753, 753 (1984) 
(“[C]ourts should decide whether something is religious by comparison with the indisputably 
religious, in light of the particular legal problem involved.”) is also quite circular in nature.  
The circularity does not undermine the soundness of the approach.  Indeed, circularity is a 
common attribute of constitutional tests, and this circularity does not necessarily constitute 
an inherent problem for those tests.  See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 
VA. L. REV. 327, 377 (2002) (explaining why many “issues of structural constitutionalism end 
up in a circle” and why this is not a problem). 
26 It hardly needs pointing out that this characteristic does not distinguish the test from other 
constitutional tests.   
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associate the intelligent design of the universe with religion.  There is no 
significant non-religious school of thought that has an intelligent designer or 
creator as a core concept, even if might be the case, as Beckwith suggests, 
that some have used the term “God” in a philosophical sense.27  Finally, to 
the extent that Supreme Court language is relevant to the determination of 
important constitutional questions (which is a great extent indeed), the Court 
in Edwards specifically described the belief that “a supernatural being created 
mankind” as a “religious viewpoint.”28   
 
 In the context of addressing whether ID constitutes religion, 
Beckwith argues that evolution and ID “are not two different subjects (the 
first religion, the second science) but two different answers about the same 
subject.”29  For example, in his full-length book, Law, Darwinism, and Public 
Education: The Establishment Clause and the Challenge of Intelligent Design, Beckwith 
responds to my claim that evolution differs from ID in that the former 
“deals only with proximate causes, not ultimate ones,” by claiming that my 
position is “wide of the mark” because: “Naturalistic evolution in fact 
provides an answer to the very same question ID provides an answer: What is 
the origin of apparent design in biological organisms and/or other aspects of 
the natural universe?  Evolution answers the question by appealing to the 
forces of unguided matter, the latter to intelligent agency.  Same question.  
Different answers.”30 
 
 It is not entirely clear what Beckwith is trying to do with this 
argument.  Although it is included in the book’s section on ID’s 
constitutional status as religion, Beckwith ties the argument to his claim that 
“forbidding the teaching of ID . . . in public schools because it lends support 
to a religion, while exclusively permitting or requiring the teaching of 
naturalistic evolution unconditionally, might be construed by a court as 
viewpoint discrimination, a violation of state neutrality on matters of religion, 
and/or the institutionalizing of a metaphysical orthodoxy.”31  To the extent 
that this is Beckwith’s main claim, it fails both as a descriptive matter and a 
normative one.   
 
For one thing, schools likely do not forbid the teaching of ID, when 
they do so, because ID “lends support” to a religion, but rather because they 
believe either that it is religion (and thus cannot be promoted in the public 
schools) or that it is bad science, and therefore does not belong in a science 
classroom.  Moreover, Beckwith’s suggestion that public schools must be 
viewpoint neutral in what they teach is clearly incorrect.  While the 
government may not discriminate against private speakers on the basis of 
                                                 
27 BECKWITH, L, D, & PL, supra n. 6, at 164. 
28 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 591-92 (1987). 
29 BECKWITH, L, D, & PL, supra n. 6, at 150. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 149. 
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viewpoint in an open or limited public forum,32 there is no constitutional 
requirement that the state’s own speech remain neutral.33  If the Constitution 
did impose such a requirement, then schools could not endorse any 
controversial moral or factual viewpoint whatsoever.  They could not tell 
students, for example, to stay away from drugs, that gender equality is 
something worth striving for, or that the Holocaust actually occurred, 
without also presenting the arguments to the contrary.     
 
To the extent that Beckwith is trying to use this “two answers to the 
same question” argument in some way to establish that ID is not religion for 
constitutional purposes, the argument also fails.  For one thing, it is far from 
clear that evolutionists would agree that the question they are seeking to 
answer is how to explain the apparent design of the universe and its 
biological organisms.  But even if at some level of generality this were the 
question they were addressing, they would be addressing the question in such 
a different fashion than ID theorists that they could hardly be said to be 
asking the same question in any meaningful way.  For evolutionists the 
question would be something like: “What is the best naturalistic explanation 
that we can study and test and measure using the scientific method for the 
universe’s apparent design?” whereas the ID theorists are asking a much 
different question, namely: “What is the best explanation for the apparent 
design, period?”  ID theorists answer this question by pointing to a 
supernatural intelligent designer, but evolutionists claim that such an answer 
is out of bounds with respect to their question because it is impossible, at 
least at this point in human development, to say anything helpful or 
meaningful at all within the confines of the scientific method about such a 
designer.34   
 
Beckwith claims that by responding to the claims of ID theorists in 
this way, evolutionists are committing themselves to so-called philosophical 
naturalism, an ontological world-view which inherently rejects the existence 
of supernatural phenomena.35  This is simply not true.  The fact that 
scientists apply the scientific method in their work reflects only a recognition 
that historically this method has produced tremendously successful results, in 
terms of explanation and prediction of natural phenomena (much better, for 
example, then looking to supernatural explanations, intuition, random 
                                                 
32 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 
829-30 (1995). 
33 Indeed, there is not even a requirement that the government’s funding of private speech 
(as opposed to regulation of that speech) be viewpoint neutral.  See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 
U.S. 173 (1991) (upholding regulations prohibiting grant recipients from recommending 
abortion to patients). 
34 See, e.g., Eugenie Scott, Scott Replies to Dembski, 
http://www.ncseweb.org/resources/articles/3598_scott_replies_to_dembski_2_2_2001.asp 
(Feb. 1, 2001) (“One cannot use natural processes to hold constant the actions of 
supernatural forces; hence it is impossible to test (by naturalistic methodology) supernatural 
explanations . . . Whether a supernatural force does or does not act is thus outside of what 
science can tell us.”). 
35 See BECKWITH, L, D & PL, supra n. 6, at 6-7; 92-95. 
  8
number drawing, etc.), rather than any a priori metaphysical commitment to 
naturalism.36  Indeed, many scientists, who use the scientific method regularly 
as part of their day-to-day work, are theists, which suggests that a 
commitment to methodological naturalism (the commitment to using the 
scientific method to explain and predict natural phenomena) does not in fact 
entail or imply a commitment to philosophical naturalism.37  My original 
claim, then, that evolutionists and intelligent design theorists are in fact 
asking very different questions, is hardly “wide of the mark.”  Instead, it is 
Beckwith’s critique that misses the target. 
 
In any event, the most important point is that whether the two camps 
are asking different questions is simply irrelevant to resolving the 
constitutional question of whether ID counts as religion.  The nature of an 
answer—in other words, whether that answer is “religious” or “scientific” or 
“political” or “literary” or whatever—turns on the content of the answer, not 
the question that it is answering.  Different fields of study seek to explain the 
same phenomena all the time, but this does not mean that their answers 
should be lumped together under the same label.   
 
To take one small example from the legal field, political scientists and 
legal academics approach the question of why the Supreme Court decides 
cases the way it does in very different ways.  Legal academics tend to look at 
the specific nature of the legal question presented and the strength of the 
competing legal arguments, whereas political scientists tend to place far more 
emphasis on the ideological commitments of the Justices and which political 
party has been primarily responsible for the appointment of the particular 
Justices serving on the Court.38  The two fields employ very different 
assumptions and methodologies, and come to very different conclusions.  
The fact that they happen to be addressing the same question does not justify 
grouping their answers together as representing the same field of inquiry.  To 
take another example from the realm of religion, imagine a person wondering 
whether to eat a lobster.  The person asks both a dietitian and an Orthodox 
Jewish rabbi what to do.  The dietitian tells the person to eat the lobster 
                                                 
36 See, e.g., Brian Leiter, The Denouement to the VanDyke Debate about Intelligent Design Creationism, 
http://webapp.utexas.edu/blogs/archives/bleiter/000954.html (“The difficulty [with calling 
science’s naturalistic methodology ‘a priori’] is that science did not ‘a priori pick a naturalistic 
methodology’; it adopted, based on evidence and experience (i.e., a posteriori), the methods that 
worked: it turns out that if you make predictions, test the predictions against experience, 
refine the hypotheses on which the predictions are based, test them again, and so on, you 
figure out how to predict and control the world around you.”); Matthew Brauer, Steven G. 
Gey & Barbara Forrest, Is It Science Yet?: Intelligent Design Creationism and the Constitution, WASH. 
U. L. Q. (forthcoming) 
37 See Brauer, et al., supra n. 36, at __. 
38 For a comparison of the two approaches to Supreme Court decision-making, see 
Theodore S. Ruger, Pauline T. Kim, Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, The Supreme 
Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court 
Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150, 1152-60 (2004). 
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because it is high in protein and low in fat;39 the rabbi tells the person not to 
eat the lobster because it is not kosher.  The two advisors have answered the 
same question, but is there any doubt that the rabbi’s answer is religious and 
the dietitian’s is not?40 
 
Thus, even if evolutionists and ID theorists were asking the same 
question, it would not mean that their answers should be categorized the 
same way.  When the evolutionist answers the question of “what is the origin 
of apparent design in biological organisms and/or other aspects of the 
natural universe” (assuming, again, that this is what the evolutionist is 
asking), by responding “the apparent design of biological organisms can be 
explained by evolution through natural selection,” the answer does not sound 
in religion.  When the ID theorist, on the other hand, responds by saying “we 
can explain this apparent design by reference to an intelligent creator who 
created the universe and everything in it,” that answer sounds in religion.41  
The two answers are fundamentally different in kind and category, even if we 
assume that the two questions are the same.  The Establishment Clause 
simply prohibits the government from teaching the religious answer (but not 
the non-religious answer) as truth. 
 
 All this wrangling over whether ID constitutes “religion” may, 
however, be beside the point.  After all, although public schools cannot 
promote or advance or endorse or teach the truth of any religion, they are 
perfectly free to teach about religion as much as they want.42  They can teach 
about Christianity, about Judaism, about Zoroastrianism, and about Raelianism.43  
Not only can they teach about religion, but they should teach about religion, 
and they do not teach about religion nearly enough.44  So, if public schools 
can teach about religion, why shouldn’t they be able to teach about ID?  To 
some degree they certainly can.  For example, if a public school chose to 
teach about the ID movement in a current affairs class, or about the 
philosophical claims of ID in a philosophy of science class, or about the 
truth claims of ID in a comparative religion class, most likely these choices 
would pose no constitutional problem at all.   
 
                                                 
39 This is true.  See http://www.nutritiondata.com/facts-001-02s037v.html (noting that, despite 
having 104 milligrams of cholesterol, 1 cup of cooked northern lobster has thirty grams of 
protein and one gram of total fat. 
40 The dietitian’s answer—to the effect it might cause a religious believer on the fence to eat 
the lobster because of its healthy qualities—may have the effect of influencing the believer’s 
religious practice, but this doesn’t make the answer religious any more than, for example, a 
government policy outlawing all uses of peyote, including religious uses.   
41 See text accompanying notes 24-28, supra. 
42 For an extended consideration of the constitutional issues involved in teaching about 
religion, see Jay D. Wexler, Preparing for the Clothed Public Square: Teaching About Religion, Civic 
Education, and the Constitution, 43 WM. &  MARY L. REV. 1159, 1243-62 (2002). 
43 Raelianism is a relatively new religious movement that believes aliens created the human 
race 25,000 years ago.  See The Raelians, http://www.carm.org/raelians.htm. 
44 For an extended argument that schools should teach about religion, see Wexler, supra n. 
42, at 1200-20. 
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Things are very different, however, when schools propose to teach 
ID in a science classroom as an alternative scientific theory to evolution.  As 
I have discussed elsewhere, the fact that science teachers generally do not 
teach science objectively but rather present the best thinking in the field as 
the current state of knowledge poses the significant risk that even well-
intentioned teachers may end up leaving students with the impression that 
ID is in fact true.45  This problem is exacerbated by the lack of adequate 
materials for teachers to use to teach evolution and ID together in an 
objective fashion.46  Most important, however, even a policy that urges 
schools to use an objective approach to teaching about ID might constitute 
an unconstitutional endorsement of religion, such that the very adoption of 
the policy would be unconstitutional, even if teachers were able to teach 
successfully about ID in an objective manner.  Whether this would be the 
case turns in large part on the proper understanding of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Edwards, to which the Essay now turns. 
 
 
II.  What About Edwards? 
  
 
Professor Beckwith and I agree that the Supreme Court’s 1987 
decision in Edwards v. Aguillard is the most important existing precedent for 
evaluating the constitutionality of teaching ID in public schools, but we 
disagree on which way the case points.47  In Edwards, the Court struck down 
Louisiana’s attempt to require its schools to teach both creation science and 
evolution whenever they taught one of those subjects.  The Court found that 
the statute was animated by an improper religious purpose.  In my view, the 
Court emphasized four problems with the Louisiana creation science equal 
time statute which are relevant to addressing the constitutionality of any ID 
policy: (1) the poor fit between the means of the statute and its ends (the goal 
of promoting academic freedom); (2) the historic link between religion and 
                                                 
45 See Wexler, supra n. 7, at 821. 
46 See id. at 822. 
47 As I have explained elsewhere, I think that the Edwards case is relevant to understanding 
not only how the Court might review an ID policy’s purpose, but also how it would review 
the claim that an ID policy endorsed religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.  The 
Court in Edwards considered the former and not the latter, but it seems that the same factors 
that led it to conclude that the legislature there had no secular purpose would also have led it 
to conclude that the statute endorsed religion.  See Wexler, supra n. 7, at 827.  Thus, I analyze 
the same factors for both possible constitutional objections.  My personal belief is that the 
endorsement analysis is superior to the religious purpose analysis in a case in which the 
legislature articulates a secular purpose. 
Of course, the Court’s recent decision in Van Orden v. Perry, No. 03-1500, slip op. 
(2000), particularly Justice Breyer’s controlling concurrence in that case, in which he writes 
that there is “no test-related substitute for the exercise of legal judgment,” id. at 3 (Breyer, J., 
concurring in judgment), casts some doubt on the state of the law in the area of government 
sponsorship or endorsement of religion.  Without further elucidation from the Court or 
Justice Breyer, however, I would suggest that the same analysis provided in this Essay would 
apply to the sort of “know it when I see it” approach of Justice Breyer as well as to a 
purpose or endorsement approach. 
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critiques of evolution; (3) the singling out of evolution from among all 
possible topics of reform; and (4) statements from the legislative history 
indicating an intent to promote religion.  All of these factors are present in 
the ID controversy.48  Stated in a very strong form, the constitutional case 
against ID can be phrased in terms of these four factors as follows:  Against 
a long visible historic background of obviously religious opposition to the 
teaching of evolution, once again another movement arrives that often 
speaks in very religious terms and singles out evolution from among all 
topics in the school curriculum for change, in order to achieve the purported 
goal of informing students about a significant scientific controversy when in 
fact no such controversy exists.  What message does a school send to the 
reasonable observer if it embraces such a movement?  It seems likely that the 
received message would be that the government is reforming the curriculum 
for religious reasons, which is exactly what the Court in Edwards said the 
government cannot do.49 
 
 For Beckwith, Edwards supports the constitutionality of teaching ID 
because (1) ID is historically and textually distinguishable from Genesis’s 
accounts of creation as well as the creation science involved in Edwards; and 
(2) the Supreme Court in Edwards recognized that teaching scientific 
alternatives to evolution for some secular purpose might be legitimate.50  I 
disagree that either of these arguments help the legal case for teaching ID.   
  
A. Historic Taint 
 
On the first of these arguments, Beckwith contends that “ID’s 
intellectual pedigree is of a different order than the creation science the Court 
repudiated in Edwards.”51  He notes that “ID is neither historically connected 
to Scopes nor is its literature . . . transparently derived from the Book of 
Genesis.”52  Furthermore, he describes as “patently unreasonable”53 my 
purported claim “that because ID has some historical connection to the 
creation/evolution controversy, it would not pass the Edwards standard,”54 
and accuses me of making “the genetic fallacy a principle of constitutional 
jurisprudence.”55 
 
 To clarify, my position has never been that schools are barred from 
teaching any subject or theory that bears some historical connection to 
                                                 
48 See id. at 826-27. 
49 See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593 (1987). 
50 BECKWITH, L, D & PE, supra n. 6, at 154-64. 
51 Id. at 154. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id.  According to Beckwith, “The genetic fallacy occurs when the origin of a viewpoint or 
argument, rather than its merits, is employed to dismiss it out of hand.”  Id. at 171 n. 67.  I 
believe that it is quite clear that I did not dismiss any argument “out of hand” but rather 
dismissed it on the basis of sound analysis.   
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religion.56  Indeed, I have argued at length that schools can and should teach 
about religion,57 an argument that would make no sense if I really wanted to 
make the genetic fallacy a principle of first amendment law, for what could 
be more closely related to religion than religion itself?  Far from arguing that 
teaching ID is unconstitutional simply because it has some historical 
connection to the long-standing controversy over evolution, my argument 
rather is that under the Supreme Court’s endorsement test,58 singling out 
evolution from all the topics in the school curriculum for reform by teaching 
students a purportedly scientific critique of evolution that has no support 
within the scientific community will likely be understood by a reasonable 
observer as continuing the long tradition of trying to reform the school 
curriculum to promote a religious belief.   
 
 Beckwith is correct that ID is somewhat different from creation 
science and its previous iterations.  ID is based on purportedly scientific 
theories and explanations for observed data, such as William Dembski’s 
notion of an explanatory filter to detect the existence of design in natural 
systems59 and Michael Behe’s theory of irreducible complexity that claims 
certain biological systems are too complex to have come into existence 
through evolutionary processes alone.60  Of course, both Dembski’s and 
Behe’s arguments have been widely critiqued,61 but this does not mean that 
ID theory is the exact same system of thought as the creation science put 
forward in Edwards.  By itself, however, this means little.  There may be some 
areas of law in which a party may be able to make small adjustments to its 
practices to fall outside the letter of a legal prohibition, but constitutional 
law, and certainly First Amendment law, is not one of them.  For better or 
                                                 
56 See, e.g., Wexler, supra n. 1, at 464-65 (arguing that a particular iteration of intelligent design 
would fail the endorsement test for a variety of reasons, including historic similarities to past 
practices). 
57 See generally Wexler, supra n. 42. 
58 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring); County of 
Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 
(1989) (adopting the endorsement test first articulated by Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in 
Lynch).  The Court recently reiterated the endorsement standard in striking down displays of 
the Ten Commandments in the courthouses of two Kentucky counties.  See McCreary 
County, Kentucky v. American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, Slip Op. No. 03-1693, at 
19-21; id. at 3 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
59 See WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI, THE DESIGN INFERENCE: ELIMINATING CHANCE THROUGH 
SMALL PROBABILITIES (1998). 
60 SEE MICHAEL J. BEHE, DARWIN’S BLACK BOX: THE BIOCHEMICAL CHALLENGE TO 
EVOLUTion (1996). 
61 On Behe, see, e.g., Kenneth Miller, Review of Darwin’s Black Box, 16 
CREATION/EVOLUTION 36 (1996), available at 
http://biomed.brown.edu/Faculty/M/Miller/Behe.html; H. Allen Orr, Darwin v. Intelligent 
Design (Again), BOSTON REV., Dec. 1996/Jan. 1997; see generally Behe’s Empty Box, 
http://www.simonyi.ox.ac.uk/dawkins/WorldOfDawkins-archive/Catalano/box/ 
behe.shtml#reviews (collecting reviews).  On Dembski, see, e.g., Massimo Pigliucci, Chance, 
Necessity, and the War Against Science, 50 BIOSCIENCE 79 (2000); Branden Fitelson, Eliot Sober 
& Elliott Sober, How Not to Detect Design—A Review of William Dembski’s The Design 
Inference, 66 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 472 (1999). 
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for worse, the Court has created an Establishment Clause doctrine that 
requires courts to use common sense to figure out what message the 
government sends through its actions.62  This, in turn, requires courts to seek 
to understand, with some sensitivity, the entire context of the challenged 
practice.63  As the Supreme Court has made clear, one of the most important 
elements of this context is the practice’s historical background, which in the 
case of ID,64 means the entire history of religious opposition to evolution. 
 
 The fact that the ID movement is different in some senses from the 
iterations that came before it does not demonstrate that it is not in important 
senses the same: it has very close religious cognates (Paley’s 19th century 
argument65); it singles out evolution from among all topics in the curriculum; 
it contends that evolution is too materialistic and naturalistic; it uses the same 
kind of language and discourse to attack evolution as previous religious 
attempts to discredit evolution;66 its audience is overwhelmingly constituted 
by adherents of traditional religions;67 it argues that a supernatural entity 
created all of mankind, which is what Edwards said was so problematic about 
creation science;68 and its leaders and implementers are generally very 
religious and often speak in explicitly religious terms.69  Putting all of these 
factors together, the reasonable observer viewing the introduction of ID into 
the public school curriculum would likely identify ID with a specific religious 
project. 
 
 To return to Beckwith’s criticism of my position, then, might it be 
the case that at least as a practical matter, my approach to ID would make it 
impossible for those who seek to reform the public school curriculum’s 
                                                 
62 Of course, the Court’s endorsement test has been widely criticized by scholars.  See, e.g., 
Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the “No 
Endorsement Test,” 86 MICH. L. REV. 266 (1987); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a 
Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 117-34 (1992).   
63 See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595-97 (Blackmun, J.). 
64 See id. at 629-31 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
65 See WILLIAM PALEY, NATURAL THEOLOGY (1845). 
66 See Wexler, supra n. __, at 464-65 (arguing that the ID textbook, Of Pandas and People, uses 
the same anti-evolution arguments as previous anti-evolution iterations). 
67 See, e.g., Memorandum from Rebecca Wittman to Mark Edwards, Re: Zogby America Report, 
www.discovery.org/articleFiles/PDFs/ZogbyFinalReport.pdf (Sept. 21, 2001) (reporting 
that overwhelming majority of those questioned who believe in intelligent design and the 
teaching of intelligent design are Protestants); Zogby Poll, 
www.nmidnet.org/OhioZogbyPoll.pdf (May 8, 2002) (reporting that 80% of those Ohioans 
questioned who strongly agree with the notion that students should learn about scientific 
evidence in favor of intelligent design are Catholic or Protestant); Survey: Protestants Support 
Intelligent Design, THE CHRISTIAN POST, May 26, 2005, available at 
http://www.christianpost.com/article/education/822/full/survey.protestants.back.intelligen
t.design/1.htm (poll reports that among doctors most proponents of intelligent design are 
Protestant). 
68 See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 591-92.     
69 For an account of the religious views and discourse of ID supporters, see, e.g., BARBARA 
FORREST & PAUL GROSS, CREATIONISM’S TROJAN HORSE: THE WEDGE OF INTELLIGENT 
DESIGN 15-33 (2004). 
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presentation of science and religion to make any significant impact on that 
curriculum?  Have I placed an insurmountable barrier in front of those who 
oppose evolution and support religious views on origins?  Will reforms 
invariably be tainted by their historical associations?  I do not think so.  It is 
true that because of the long and very visible history of religious opposition 
to evolution, opponents of the way our public schools teach science and 
religion will have to make special efforts to disassociate themselves from 
what has gone before in order to defuse the message that they are sending 
with their reforms.  For one thing, if any reform is to pass constitutional 
muster, it will probably have to go beyond singling out evolution to address a 
broader subsection of the curriculum.   But this does not mean that reform is 
impossible.  For example, schools would most likely fall within constitutional 
limits if they taught a wide variety of minority views in science as a way of 
teaching students how the scientific process works, taught about religion and 
religious views on origins (including creation stories from different cultures 
and traditions, in addition to the Biblical ones) in history or comparative 
religion classes, or taught about the evolution controversy in history or 
current affairs classes. 
 
 B. Secular Purposes. 
 
 Beckwith’s second argument regarding Edwards is that the case 
establishes that public schools can teach ID so long as they do so to further 
some secular purpose.70  This argument, too, does not win Beckwith the day.  
Two preliminary points are worth making before exploring the four specific 
secular purposes that Beckwith proposes could animate an ID policy.  First, 
of course, although a secular purpose is a necessary condition for a policy’s 
constitutionality, it is not a sufficient one.  A statute or regulation or any 
other form of government action may be unconstitutional, even though it is 
animated by a secular purpose, if it advances or promotes or endorses 
religion.71  Indeed, in most cases in which the Court has invalidated 
government activity under the Establishment Clause, it has done so even 
after finding the activity supported by some secular purpose.72  Second, 
Edwards clearly demonstrates that, at least in the area of teaching evolution in 
the public schools, the Court will not accept uncritically the government’s 
recitation of a secular purpose.  Instead, the Court (and lower courts 
faithfully following Supreme Court precedent) will examine the actual 
relationship between the means of the policy and the purported secular goal 
of the policy to test whether that purported secular goal is in fact the real 
purpose underlying the policy.  If the relationship between the means and 
                                                 
70 See BECKWITH, L, D & PE, supra n. 6, at 156. 
71 See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649 (2002) (proceeding to analyze 
effects of voucher program after concluding that the program was enacted to serve a secular 
purpose). 
72 See Robert A. Sedler, The Settled Nature of American Constitutional Law, 48 WAYNE L. REV. 
173, 329 (2002) (“While a few cases have been decided under the religious purpose element, 
the overwhelming number of Establishment Clause cases coming before the Court have 
been decided under the religious effect element.”). 
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ends is too attenuated, the Court will not hesitate to find the policy 
unconstitutional.73 
 
 Beckwith argues that a government body could adopt an ID policy 
for one of four possible secular purposes: (1) to introduce students to an 
important new body of scholarship;74 (2) to “enhanc[e] and protec[t] the 
academic freedom of teachers and students” who support ID or disagree 
with evolution;75 (3) to erase the perception that the curriculum favors, or 
endorses, an irreligious point of view;76 and (4) to maintain neutrality 
between religious belief and non-belief.77  The following discussion treats 
these four purposes in turn, grouping the latter two together because of their 
similarity.  In each case, the discussion addresses both whether courts should 
view these purposes as sincere and whether a policy adopted pursuant to 
such a purported secular purpose would likely advance or endorse religion in 
violation of the Establishment Clause, despite that purpose. 
 
  1. Introducing Students to Important Scholarship 
 
 Beckwith first argues that schools could defend an ID policy on the 
basis that they are introducing students to an important body of scholarship.  
Citing the Court’s statement in Edwards that “teaching a variety of scientific 
theories about the origins of humankind to schoolchildren might be validly 
done with the clear secular intent of enhancing the effectiveness of science 
instruction,”78 Beckwith argues that “[a] state could appeal to the importance 
of exposing students to reputable scholarship that critiques the 
methodological naturalism behind naturalistic evolution and the ontological 
materialism entailed by it.”79  The notion that schools can teach students ID 
to introduce them to a new and important body of scholarship suffers, 
however, from the same flaw that the creation science statute in Edwards 
itself suffered—namely a significant gap between the means and ends of the 
policy.  Because there is no significant scientific disagreement about the basic 
soundness of evolution and the weakness of ID as a scientific theory,80 courts 
reviewing an ID policy justified on the grounds that the policy is intended to 
introduce students to an important body of scholarship may very well be 
correct to find that the purpose is in fact a sham or that the policy endorses 
religion despite the articulated purpose. 
 
                                                 
73 See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 586-90.  This could be either because the Court finds that the 
legislative purpose is in fact religious, or because it finds that the policy endorses religion. 
74 See BECKWITH, L, D & PE, supra n. 6, at 160.  I have changed the order of the four secular 
purposes to facilitate my discussion.  His order puts numbers 3-4 before numbers 1-2. 
75 Id.  
76 Id. at 156. 
77 Id. at 157-60. 
78 Edwards, 482 U.S. at 594. 
79 BECKWITH, L, D & PE, supra n. 6, at 160. 
80 See text accompanying notes 81-85, infra. 
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 Unlike evolutionary theory, which the scientific community widely 
supports and believes to be one of the most important, central, and robust 
theories in all of biology (if not all of science),81 ID theory has been roundly 
rejected by mainstream scientists.82  Although scientist Michael Behe’s 
foundational ID book, Darwin’s Black Box, has been sporadically cited in the 
scientific literature, for the most part ID theory has been completely absent 
from the peer reviewed literature.83  For example, one very recent study 
showed that only seventeen articles cited any ID terms in an ID-specific 
sense, and some of those citations came in the context of criticism of those 
concepts.84  As Professors Brauer, Forrest, and Gey have persuasively 
demonstrated, the status of ID theory in the scientific literature pales in 
comparison even to the widely rejected theory that the HIV virus does not in 
fact cause AIDS.85 
 
 In his defense of ID’s importance, Beckwith notes that the theory 
has been the subject of much popular and journalistic writing and even 
academic reviews, responses, symposia, and conferences.86  This is hardly 
surprising, however, given that ID is undoubtedly an important social, 
cultural, political, and even religious phenomenon, but it is also entirely 
irrelevant to the idea’s status as a scientific theory.  Journalists write about 
ID, and academics discuss and respond to the claims of ID not because ID 
has attained any success within the scientific community but because it has 
gained hold among religious conservatives and politicians and thus has 
helped reshape the cultural and educational landscape in important ways.  
Indeed, it may even be accurate to describe some of ID’s success in the 
popular literature as owing much to ID’s scientific shortcomings rather than 
its strengths; one aspect of ID that might have attracted journalistic attention 
is the success the theory has attained among politicians and the public despite 
its failure among scientists. 
 
 Beckwith intriguingly argues that the Supreme Court’s 1993 decision 
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.87 suggests that success in the peer 
review process should not be considered highly relevant in assessing a 
theory’s scientific merits.88  In that case, the Court held that Rule 702 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence did not limit scientific expert testimony to those 
theories that have become “generally accepted” in the scientific community,89 
as the then Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia had previously 
held in a 1923 case called Frye v. United States,90 which pre-dated the adoption 
                                                 
81 For a collection of citations on this point, see Wexler, supra n. 7, at 804-05, nn. 234-35. 
82 See id. at 805-07, n. 236. 
83 See id. at 807, n. 237. 
84 See Brauer, et al., supra n. 36, at __. 
85 See id. at __. 
86 See BECKWITH, L, D & PE, supra n. 6, at xiii-xvii. 
87 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
88 See BECKWITH, L, D & PE, supra n. 6, at 23. 
89 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589. 
90 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
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of the Federal Rules.  Because the Court noted in Daubert that peer review 
acceptance “is not a sine qua non of admissibility” and “does not necessarily 
correlate with reliability,”91 Beckwith concludes that the test of ID’s scientific 
legitimacy should turn on “arguments and their soundness” and not their 
“popularity.”92 
 
 Though the argument is inspired, Daubert in fact provides no support 
for ID’s constitutionality.  For one thing, the Court did recognize the 
importance of peer review, when it wrote that, “submission to the scrutiny of 
the scientific community is a component of ‘good science,’ in part because it 
increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in methodology will be 
detected.”93  Moreover, to the degree that ID is animated by a rejection of 
methodological naturalism, or the scientific method, Daubert undermined the 
scientific legitimacy of ID when it explained that the “scientific knowledge” 
standard of Rule 702 “establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability” and 
that “to qualify as ‘scientific knowledge,’ an inference or assertion must be 
derived by the scientific method.”94   
 
 More importantly, because Daubert concerns a fundamentally 
different issue than whether public schools can constitutionally teach ID, it 
actually—when understood correctly—hurts the case for ID’s 
constitutionality.  In Daubert, the Court held that Rule 702 allows the 
introduction of some expert scientific testimony into federal court even 
though the proffered science is not “generally accepted.”  In reaching this 
conclusion, the Court engaged in a run-of-the-mill statutory interpretation 
exercise, and it found that Congress, through its enactment of Rule 702, had 
intended to broaden the range of evidence allowed into federal courts 
substantially beyond that which previously was allowed.95  Because Congress 
had intended to allow this broad range of evidence into the federal courts, 
the Court concluded that even evidence which had not been subject to 
extensive peer review could be admitted into court.96  Thus, if Daubert stands 
for any general principle regarding the prerequisite of peer review, it stands 
for the notion that if there is a general rule which seeks to allow a very broad 
range of evidence into a forum, then peer review need not be required as a 
prerequisite for admission.   
 
 Public school classrooms, however, are entirely different from federal 
courtrooms.  In public schools, the general standard of admissibility for the 
discussion of scientific theories in science classes is far stricter than Rule 
                                                 
91 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. 
92 BECKWITH, L, D & PE, supra n. 6, at 23. 
93 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. 
94 Id. at 590. 
95 See id. at 589 (“Given the Rules’ permissive backdrop and their inclusion of a specific rule 
on expert testimony that does not mention ‘general acceptance, the assertion that the Rules 
somehow assimilated Frye is unconvincing.”). 
96 See id. at 593. 
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702.97  Schools generally teach only the best, most-settled scientific 
theories—the ones that have gained the greatest foothold in the profession 
and are the most robust and persuasive theories in their field—rather than 
teaching any theory that can lay any claim at all to plausibility.98   Public 
school science classrooms are thus governed not by a liberal admission rule 
like Rule 702 but by a rule, customary though it may be, that is even stricter 
than the Frye rule that preceded Rule 702.  Thus, Daubert is completely 
inapplicable to the ID context, and indeed can be read to undermine the case 
for ID’s constitutionality, to the extent that it suggests non-peer reviewed 
theories should only be allowed into a forum if some governing authority 
specifically provides for extremely broad admission of evidence.   
 
Because the authority in the public school context is of course set by 
custom or school policy (whether formal or informal) and can thus be altered 
by the school itself, one could read Daubert as lending some support to a 
school that wanted to broaden what types of theories it teaches students 
generally.  For example, if a school decided that it would no longer restrict 
itself to teaching the most successful scientific theories but would also begin 
discussing as possibly true a variety of minority or fringe theories, it could 
plausibly point to the Supreme Court’s language in Daubert as support.  It 
could, for instance, as a rhetorical matter, say to parents and the community 
that, “Hey, the Supreme Court has allowed fringe theories into the federal 
courts, why shouldn’t we be able to allow fringe theories into the 
classrooms?”99  But that, of course, is not what the ID proponents want to 
do.  They do not suggest that schools change their approach to teaching 
science generally; rather, they argue that schools should make an exception to 
their general strict admission rules in the one isolated instance of ID.  If a 
school generally operates under the principle that it will only teach students 
about the best scientific theories, the ones that have fared the best under the 
rigorous peer review process that is at the heart of the scientific professions, 
and it then makes a single exception to allow its teachers to teach about one 
theory that has been entirely unsuccessful under that process, then 
reasonable observers would likely understand that the school has decided to 
teach that one theory for some reason other than to teach students about a 
new and important body of scientific scholarship. 
 
 2. Protecting Academic Freedom 
 
                                                 
97 That the standard is more than likely set by custom, rather than rule, does not make it less 
important for these purposes. 
98 See Wexler, supra n. 7, at 821. 
99 To be consistent with federal court practice, the school would have to add the very 
important caveat that it would also teach students about how mainstream science has 
critiqued the relevant fringe theory.  One of the basic premises of federal evidence law is that 
anything introduced into a courtroom can be tested and subjected to critique by the other 
party.  This could be a problem for ID, to the extent that a school allows the teaching of ID 
but does not require that students be made aware of ID’s failure to succeed in the scientific 
community and of the numerous critiques of ID theory as terrible science. 
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Second, pointing to a number of instances in which ID supporters 
were met with “marginalization, hostility, and public ridicule because of their 
support of ID and/or doubts about [evolution],”100 Beckwith argues that 
schools could defend an ID policy on the basis that they are protecting the 
academic freedom of their teachers and students.  Beckwith suggests that 
public school teachers in fact possess a first amendment right to exercise 
their academic freedom by introducing ID,101 and that a policy recognizing 
this right would “simply be affirming by statute or written policy what is 
already a fixed point in constitutional law,”102 but in fact public school 
teachers possess no such constitutional right, as will be discussed below.103  
Nonetheless, even in the absence of such a right, one could perhaps imagine a 
school wanting to enact an ID policy for the purpose of promoting the 
academic freedom interests of its teachers.   
 
This argument, however, is unpersuasive, although the precise reason 
for its lack of persuasiveness differs depending on what policy the school 
already takes towards allowing teachers to introduce materials of their own 
choosing into the classroom.  If the school already places no limits on what 
the teacher can introduce as a general matter, then a policy that specifically 
allows the teaching of ID cannot plausibly be said to be promoting the 
academic freedom of teachers, since they already possess that freedom as a 
matter of underlying policy.  This is precisely what happened in Edwards, 
where the Court held that the Louisiana statute could not possibly have 
furthered the state’s purported interest in promoting academic freedom since 
nothing prevented the teachers from exercising that freedom in the first 
place.104 
 
  On the other hand, if the underlying school policy restricts teachers 
from teaching material that is not specifically included in the curriculum, then 
Beckwith’s rationale makes somewhat more sense, in that at least the school 
would be allowing teachers to teach something they would otherwise not be 
able to teach.  However, like Beckwith’s first argument, this one too suffers 
from a substantial disconnect between means and ends.  If the true interest 
of the state or school board or school was really to promote the academic 
freedom of teachers who want to introduce controversial topics into the 
classroom, why would it implement a policy that provides an exception to 
the general “no teaching material not specifically included in the curriculum” 
                                                 
100 BECKWITH, L, D & PE, supra n. 6, at 160. 
101 See id. at 73-76. 
102 Id. at 163. 
103 See text accompanying notes 138-157, infra. 
104 See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 587 (“The Act does not grant teachers a flexibility that they did 
not already possess to supplant the present science curriculum with the presentation of 
theories, besides evolution, about the origin of life.  Indeed, the Court of Appeals found that 
no law prohibited Louisiana public school teachers from teaching any scientific theory.”).  
Moreover, for similar reasons, ID policies cannot be justified on grounds that they further 
the academic freedom of students, as presumably no government policy exists that would 
prohibit students from learning about ID on their own if they so choose. 
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rule only in the context of teaching about alternatives to evolution, and not in 
the myriad other contexts in which it might be appropriate?   
 
The only plausible reason to adopt such a limited policy would be 
either that ID supporters suffer disproportionately more (or more severe) 
hostility than holders of other unpopular beliefs or that hostility over ID is 
more troubling than the same type and amount of hostility toward other 
unpopular beliefs.  The latter seems constitutionally problematic, in that it 
would represent a judgment by the public school that ID is normatively more 
worthy than other beliefs, and the former seems implausible.  Polls 
consistently show that the great majority of Americans believe that an 
intelligent designer exists and that more than half reject evolution and believe 
God created human beings in essentially their current form.105  Surely there 
are beliefs held by substantially less than half of the population that would 
also require protection by a state that is truly interested in protecting the 
interests of teachers to introduce unpopular subjects and perspectives.  What 
about the teacher who wants to discuss in class his belief that there is no 
God, or that using drugs is mind-expanding, or that having sex with many 
partners is particularly fun, or that the Holocaust never occurred, or that 
gender inequality is justified?  If the school really wants to protect the 
academic freedom interests of teachers who hold unpopular beliefs, wouldn’t 
it protect at least some of these teachers as well as the one that wants to 
discuss ID theory?106   
 
Of course, there is no general legal requirement that government 
actors attempt to solve problems comprehensively, as opposed to 
incrementally.107  That is, as a general matter, nothing would prohibit a school 
from promoting the academic freedom of its teachers in one area but not 
others, even if it would make sense for the school to promote academic 
freedom in all areas equally.  The problem for ID advocates is the 
Establishment Clause, and particularly the Court’s analysis in Edwards, as well 
as the Court’s endorsement test, understood in light of that case.  Edwards 
says that at least in the area of teaching evolution and its alternatives, courts 
must look closely to the relationship between means and ends in evaluating 
whether an articulated purpose is actually a sham;108 in other words, the 
Court has shifted the burden to evolution opponents to enact changes to the 
                                                 
105 See, e.g., CBS News Poll, Poll: Creationism Trumps Evolution, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/11/22/opinion/polls/main657083.shtml (Nov. 22, 
2004) (reporting that 55% of all Americans believe “God created humans in present form” 
and another 27% believe that “Humans Evolved, God guided the process”) 
106 This would seem particularly true in light of poll results that show that almost two-thirds 
of Americans would like creationism taught alongside evolution in the public schools. 
107 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 433 (1955) (“Evils in the same field may be 
of different dimensions and proportions, requiring different remedies. Or so the legislature 
may think.  Or the reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the 
problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind.  The legislature may select one 
phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others.” (citations omitted)). 
108 See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 586-88. 
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school curriculum in such a way that the court is convinced that the real 
motive for change is not to promote a particular religious viewpoint.  To put 
it another way, a court will likely find that a policy in this area that at all 
resembles past unconstitutional policies will send a message of endorsement, 
unless the advocates for change make special efforts to defuse that message.  
The fact that there’s no particular reason to promote or protect academic 
freedom with respect to ID as opposed to other controversial topics weighs 
heavily in favor of finding a policy backed by the academic freedom rationale 
to be unconstitutional. 
 
 3. Promoting Neutrality and Erasing Endorsement 
 
 Finally, Beckwith contends that schools might teach ID either to 
“erase [the] perception” “that a certain disputed, irreligious point of view is 
favored,”109 or to ensure that by balancing the teaching of evolution (which 
“presupposes a controversial epistemology . . . entails a controversial 
metaphysics . . . and is antithetical to traditional religious belief”) with ID, it 
will “remain neutral . . . between religion and irreligion.”110  These two 
arguments are worth treating together, because they both basically assert the 
same thing, although in slightly different terms.111  Both suggest that the state 
acts with a secular purpose when it enacts a policy intended to restore 
balance to a school curriculum that in some way disadvantages religious 
points of view.  This is certainly an interesting argument, and it will take a bit 
of a detour through the current state of church-state law to understand why 
the argument ultimately fails. 
 
 Government neutrality towards religion and non-religion of course 
sounds like a laudable goal.  Why should the government intentionally take a 
position that is harmful to religious belief or practice?  More specifically, it 
perhaps seems unfair and overly intrusive at first glance for a public school 
to send a message that is at odds with somebody’s sincere religious beliefs?  
On closer look, however, it becomes quite apparent that true substantive 
neutrality towards religion is impossible.  The key to understanding this point 
is to recognize both the numerous ways that the government takes positions 
in public life and the countless viewpoints embraced by the numerous 
religious groups that populate the nation.   
 
The government takes positions in all sorts of ways in its everyday 
operations, through everything from the speeches of public officials to the 
funding of certain groups and viewpoints to the monuments it establishes on 
public property to the criminal and regulatory laws it promulgates to the 
curricula adopted by public schools.  Because the country is so religiously 
diverse, these government positions inevitably conflict with at least 
                                                 
109 BECKWITH, L, D & PE, supra n. 6, at 156. 
110 Id at 157. 
111 Even Professor Beckwith says that the two arguments are substantially the same.  See id. 
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somebody’s religious viewpoint.  For example, some112 Quakers are pacifists; 
some Christian scientists do not believe in conventional medicine; some 
Mormons believe in polygamy; groups like The Creativity Movement 
(formerly the Church of the World Creator) and the Christian Identity preach 
violence against blacks and Jews;113 some people believe that the Bible 
establishes that the Earth is flat;114 The Church of Satan believes in 
indulgence, vengeance, and engaging in sins for purposes of gratification;115 
Raelians believe that aliens created the human race about 25,000 years ago;116 
some practitioners of Vodun (commonly referred to as Voodoo) believe that 
dead people can be revived after being buried;117 some Wiccans believe that 
they can communicate with the dead through séances;118 some Jains believe it 
is wrong to kill any living thing at all, including bugs and vegetables,119 and 
may wear masks to avoid breathing in microscopic organisms;120 and some 
adherents of Falun Gong believe they can harness their life force to cure 
illnesses, see into other worlds, move objects by telekinesis, walk through 
walls, and fly.121 
 
It is certainly not the case that the government, in the messages it 
sends, must be neutral with respect to all of these religious beliefs.  For 
example, the state can take the position that racial intolerance and violence is 
wrong, that eating vegetables is not a sin, that the world is round, that people 
ought not to be vengeful, that war is sometimes justified, that it is wrong to 
marry more than one person, that conventional medicine works, and that it is 
impossible to walk through walls and fly, no matter how well one manages 
his or her life force.  The government can punish hate crimes, run public 
service ads urging citizens to eat their vegetables (or create a food pyramid to 
                                                 
112 Just to emphasize this caveat to the following list, my point here is only that there are 
some (perhaps only a few) members of each religion listed that believe in the noted practice, 
not that every member believes in the practice.  The citations provided, concededly 
superficial in nature, are not meant to establish anything more than this limited (but 
important) point. 
113 For information on these two groups, see, e.g., The Creativity Movement, 
http://www.religioustolerance.org/wcotc.htm (last visited June 22, 2005); Christian Identity 
Movement, http://www.religioustolerance.org/cr_ident.htm (last visited June 22, 2005). 
114 See, e.g., Robert P.J. Day, Documenting the Existence of “The International Flat Earth Society,”  
http://www.talkorigins.org/faqs/flatearth.html (1993) (last visited June 22, 2005). 
115 See http://www.churchofsatan.com/home.html (“The Nine Satanic Statements”) (last 
visited June 22, 2005). 
116 See http://www.rael.org/rael_content/rael_summary.php (last visited June 22, 2005). 
117 See Vodun (and related religions), http://www.religioustolerance.org/voodoo.htm (“One 
belief unique to Vodun is that a dead person can be revived after having been buried.”). 
118 See, e.g., Hanna Nichols, Paganism and the Search for Truth and Proof, 
http://www.iamnext.com/spirituality/paganism.html (2004) (noting that modern Wiccans 
still engage in the practice of communicating with the dead through séances). 
119 See Jain Dharma, a.k.a. Jainism, http://www.religioustolerance.org/jainism.htm (last visited 
June 22, 2005). 
120 See Jainism, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jainism (last visited June 22, 2005). 
121 See, e.g., David Van Biema, The Man With the Qi,, TIME MAGAZINE, May 10, 1999 
(Interview with Li Hongzhi).  Of course, whether Falun Gong constitutes a religion for 
constitutional purposes is an open question.   
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this effect), employ navigation systems that assume a spherical Earth, preach 
kindness and tolerance toward others, engage in war, criminalize polygamy, 
fund conventional medicine, and teach in its schools that people cannot fly 
(and indeed give detention to students who try).122   
 
 The Supreme Court used to recognize that the Free Exercise Clause 
placed some limits on the government’s ability to burden religious believers 
through its actions.  Prior to 1990, the Court applied so-called strict scrutiny 
to government action that placed substantial burdens on religious belief and 
practice,123 although this scrutiny was often rather less than strict in 
practice.124  During this period, the remedy granted by the Court to believers 
who were substantially burdened in the absence of any compelling 
government interest was an individual exemption from the government law 
or action, not an injunction against the government law or action itself.125  
Thus, even though the Court found that Wisconsin’s compulsory education 
requirement was unconstitutional with respect to certain Amish parents who 
believed their children should not have to attend public school after the age 
of fifteen, the Court’s remedy was to give the plaintiffs an exemption from 
the education law, rather than striking down the law itself.126  Even this 
limited remedy, however, no longer exists under the First Amendment, ever 
since the Court decided in the (in)famous Smith case that the Free Exercise 
Clause does not prohibit the government from imposing substantial burdens 
on religious belief and practice through the application of neutral laws of 
general applicability. 127   
                                                 
122 The Constitution presumably places some limit on the state’s authority to explicitly 
criticize religion generally or a particular religion, through the Supreme Court’s somewhat 
incoherent and certainly unexplored “disapproval” prong of the endorsement test.  See Board 
of Educ. V. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 249 (1990) (“Because the Act on its face grants equal 
access to both secular and religious speech, we think it clear that the Act’s purpose was not 
to ‘endorse or disapprove of religion.’”).  But as Smith implies, a general law or practice that 
burdens religion somehow does not by itself constitute an unconstitutional disapproval of 
religion.  Perhaps an explicit statement from the state to the effect that the religion in 
question is clearly wrong to believe what it believes would be unconstitutional, but the 
examples provided here do not rise to that level. 
123 See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
124 See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (rejecting Free Exercise claim of 
soldier to wear yarmulke against military regulation because of special military context); Lyng 
v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (rejecting claim of 
Native Americans that the Forest Service’s plan to destroy sacred forest would violate their 
Free Exercise rights). 
125 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).   
126 See id. 
127 See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  The Court has provided that 
certain laws burdening religion will continue to get strict scrutiny, including laws falling 
directly under the Sherbert line of cases, id. at 880, so-called hybrid claims involving the Free 
Exercise Clause and some other constitutional right, id. (distinguishing Yoder), and laws that 
are not truly neutral or generally applicable, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of 
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (striking down local Florida ordinances for targeting the 
Santeria practice of animal sacrifice).  Also, the Court has recently upheld against an 
Establishment Clause attack the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
(“RLUIPA”), which provides for strict scrutiny review of laws that burden religious practice 
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 Thus, after Smith, a religious believer who is burdened by a neutral 
and general government action, policy, or law cannot claim a violation of his 
or her Free Exercise rights.  Instead, the believer is restricted to pursuing a 
legislative accommodation.  The state, if it so chooses, may grant the believer 
an exemption from the generally applicable law through legislation, subject to 
some constitutional limits articulated by the Supreme Court.128  These 
Establishment Clause limits require that the accommodation relieve a 
substantial burden imposed on the believer by the state; that the 
accommodation has a limited negative effect on nonbeneficiaries; and, 
importantly, that the accommodation be denominationally neutral to the 
extent possible.129  On this last point, then-Professor Michael McConnell has 
explained that, “An accommodation must not favor one form of religious 
belief over another.  Since the objective of religious accommodations is to 
enhance the freedom of choice, religious pluralism demands that, where 
possible, the government’s actions must not be permitted to affect the 
previously existing religious mix.”130 
 
 What, then, does all this have to do with Beckwith’s suggestion that a 
school might insulate itself from constitutional attack by enacting an ID 
policy with the goal of promoting neutrality in the school curriculum (or 
erasing the endorsement of irreligion in that curriculum)?  For one thing, it 
makes it quite clear that Beckwith is wrong to the extent his arguments imply 
that public schools are constitutionally required to teach ID in order to 
maintain neutrality.131  Beckwith is not alone in suggesting that the public 
school curriculum must be viewpoint neutral with respect to religion; many 
other thinkers and jurists have said the same thing.132  The argument, 
                                                                                                                                                 
in certain contexts, such as prisons that receive federal funds.  Cutter v. Wilkinson, Slip Op. 
No. 03-9877 (May 31, 2005). 
128 See, e.g., Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334-35 (1987) (rejecting Establishment Clause attack on exemption 
from Title VII’s ban on religious discrimination in hiring for religious organizations). 
129 See, e.g., Cutter, Slip Op., at 9-10 (discussing these three constitutional requirements). 
130 Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1. 
131 I think that Beckwith’s language implies exactly this when he writes that: “[A]n ID statute 
could be justified on the basis of neutrality by arguing that to teach only one theory of 
origins . . . the state is in fact advocating, aiding, fostering, and promoting irreligion, which it 
is constitutionally forbidden from doing.”  Id. at 157 (emphasis added).  This suggests that an ID 
statute is arguably constitutionally necessary to dispel the constitutionally forbidden message 
that is currently being sent by the public schools.  On the other hand, Beckwith has publicly 
stated that he does not think that public schools should, as a policy matter, at this point of 
time, teach ID, which suggests that he does not think that public schools must teach ID to 
maintain neutrality.  See http://pharyngula.org/comments/495_0_1_0_C/ (Beckwith claiming 
that he “has no horse in this race”).  To my mind, however, this latter position is in some 
tension with what he has written regarding viewpoint neutrality and the public school 
curriculum. 
132 See, e.g, WARREN A. NORD, RELIGION & AMERICAN EDUCATION: RETHINKING A 
NATIONAL DILEMMA 243 (1995) (“The Court has given public schools permission to teach 
about religion, but it has never claimed that religion must be taught to restore neutrality to a 
curriculum that is hostile to religion.  Yet, this should be its position.”); id at 8, 131, 378 
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however, is completely unworkable, ignores the fact that there are many 
religions rather than just one, and misapprehends the nature of public 
schooling, which takes all sorts of positions on all types of important public 
issues in almost everything it does.  If the argument were true, schools would 
have to teach racial hatred, flat earth theory, and flying in addition to ID to 
make sure they were not being non-neutral with respect to students who 
happen to believe in these things.  Such a course is obviously undesirable and 
not required by the First Amendment. 
 
The more important question is whether the state of the law affects 
either the secular purpose analysis or the endorsement analysis of an ID 
policy justified by such endorsement-erasing or neutrality-promoting 
concerns.  Should such a purpose be considered secular for First 
Amendment purposes?  Would articulation of this purpose truly erase any 
endorsement of religion under the Establishment Clause?  These are difficult 
questions, but ultimately the non-neutrality/endorsement purpose cannot 
save ID policies from constitutional infirmity.  Assuming for the sake of 
argument that such a purpose would pass scrutiny as a secular purpose under 
the very strict approach embodied by the Court in Edwards, an ID policy 
would still likely endorse religion even if it is put forward specifically as a way 
of balancing the curriculum between religion and non-religion. 
 
As with Beckwith’s two other possible secular purposes, this one too 
fails because of the looseness of the means-ends connection, which in fact 
strengthens the endorsement message that an ID policy would send, rather 
than erasing it.  Teaching ID as a way of promoting the neutrality of the 
public school curriculum is patently underinclusive with respect to that goal.  
As explained above, the state acts non-neutrally with regard to religious views 
of all sorts, in all types of ways.  If neutrality is really the goal, why would 
policy-makers focus only on one specific way in which the state’s messages 
are non-neutral?  Indeed, an ID policy would not even address the non-
neutrality issue in the limited setting of the public school curriculum, much 
less in the sphere of government activity as a whole.  An ID policy justified 
on neutrality or anti-endorsement grounds would in fact promote the specific 
religious belief in monotheism as compared to the myriad other religious 
beliefs that are treated in a non-neutral fashion by the state.  Such a policy 
would send the message that some instances of government non-neutrality 
are more important than others, and that therefore some religious viewpoints 
are more important than others.  More specifically, such a policy, by teaching 
ID but not polygamy, non-medical healing, or walking through walls (for 
example), would favor the religious belief in monotheism over the beliefs 
                                                                                                                                                 
(making similar points); Citizens for a Responsible Curriculum v. Montgomery County 
Public Schools, Mem. Order, Civil Action No. AW-05-1194, at p. 20-21 (May 5, 2005) 
(Judge Alexander Williams, Jr. granting order enjoining a curriculum allegedly endorsing a 
pro-gay lifestyle, in part on grounds that the curriculum presents only one view of a 
controversial subject), available at http://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/Opinions152/Opinions/ 
CRC050505.pdf 
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held by some Mormons, Christian Scientists, and Falun Gong 
practitioners.133 
 
To see this more clearly, consider what would happen if the school 
sought to deal with the religious opposition to evolution using the one 
specific method approved (in some circumstances) by the Supreme Court: a 
discretionary accommodation.  If an ID supporter sought an accommodation 
from the school board to allow his child to sit out the unit on evolution, and 
the school granted the exemption, could the school then deny an exemption 
to a Quaker who wanted her kids to sit out a discussion of why the Iraq war 
is just or to a Christian Scientist who does not want his child to learn about 
the terrific achievements of modern medicine?  Assuming that the Quaker 
and Christian Scientist claim that the lesson is offensive or troublesome in 
basically the same way that the evolution-opponent claims, the school would 
have no justification in granting one exemption but not the other.  Such a 
policy would run afoul of the requirement that accommodations be granted 
in a denominationally-neutral fashion134 and violate the Court’s ruling in 
Larson v. Valente that, “the clearest command of the EC is that one religious 
denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.”135  If a school 
cannot selectively grant accommodations, why should it be able to sidestep 
this prohibition by selectively altering the curriculum to favor one particular 
religious belief on the grounds that doing so is necessary to maintain 
neutrality? 
 
The point here is not that the First Amendment generally bars 
schools from altering the curriculum in small ways to maintain religious 
neutrality.  The point is ID specific; in light of all of ID’s other problems, 
including its historical connection with previous unconstitutional efforts and 
complete lack of support in the scientific community,136 enacting an ID 
policy with the articulated goal of maintaining neutrality or erasing 
endorsement in the school curriculum would not save the policy from 
sending the message that the curriculum was in fact being altered to promote 
a particular religious belief.137   
                                                 
133 See text accompanying notes 112-122, supra. 
134 See Cutter, Slip Op., at 10 (observing that courts “must be satisfied that [an 
accommodation’s] prescriptions are and will be administered neutrally among different 
faiths”). 
135 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982). 
136 See text accompanying notes 81-85, supra. 
137 Under the rubric of preserving neutrality, Beckwith also argues that teaching ID might be 
necessary to dispel the public school’s coercion of a non-religious viewpoint.  See 
BECKWITH, L, D & PE, supra n. 6, at 158-59 (“[P]ermitting or requiring public schools to 
teach the alternative to naturalistic evolution—Intelligent Design—would be a way to ensure 
that the Establishment Clause is not violated via the no coercion test.”).  Beckwith relies on 
the Court’s decision in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S 577 (1992), but that case is inapposite.  Lee 
stands for the notion that schools cannot coerce students into participating in religious 
exercises, even by placing them in a situation in which the coercion actually results from peer 
pressure, but the case says nothing about the government’s authority to place burdens on 
religious believers, say by making them learn something that is at odds with their religious 
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III. Academic Freedom? 
 
 
 Finally, Beckwith argues that public school teachers have some 
limited First Amendment academic freedom rights to teach ID in addition to 
teaching the prescribed biology curriculum.138  Specifically, in commenting on 
a Minnesota Court of Appeals decision called LeVake v. Independent School 
District,139 Beckwith contends that “bringing into the classroom relevant 
material that is supplementary to the curriculum (and not a violation of any 
other legal duties), when the public school teacher has adequately fulfilled all 
of her curricular obligations, is protected speech under the rubric of academic 
freedom.”140  In support of this argument, Beckwith cites dictum from 
Keyhishian v. Board of Regents,141 in which the Supreme Court opined that the 
First Amendment “does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over 
the classroom,”142 as well as select quotations from other cases like Moore v. 
Gaston County Board of Education143 and Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District,144 which are said to stand for the proposition that 
teachers possess First Amendment academic freedom rights to supplement 
the proscribed curriculum with their own materials and views.145 
 
 Beckwith is certainly correct in his claim that the First Amendment 
places some limits on the state’s authority to fire government employees, 
including public school teachers, and that those teachers do not forfeit their 
First Amendment rights when they accept a government job.  The Supreme 
Court, in a case called Pickering v. Board of Education,146 has held that teachers 
have a limited right (subject to a balancing test, in which the interest of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
beliefs.  Indeed, in Smith, the Court held that the government is free to impose such burdens, 
so long as it does so in a neutral and generally applicable manner.  If a school wishes to 
protect a student from such a burden, it may exempt him from the evolution lesson, so long 
as it exempts other students from similar burdens on their religious beliefs, but attempting to 
accommodate the ID believer by teaching ID fails for the same reason that the neutrality/ 
endorsement argument fails—it privileges ID compared to other religious viewpoints that 
are disadvantaged by the curriculum.  
138 See BECKWITH, L, D & PE, supra n. 6, at 73-76. 
139 625 N.W.2d 502 (Minn Ct. App. 2001).  Beckwith has written an entire essay about the 
issues raised by this case.  See Francis J. Beckwith, A Liberty Not Fully Evolved?, 39 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 1311 (2002). 
140 BECKWITH, L, D & PE, supra n. 6, at 76.  It is unclear what the phrase, “other legal 
duties,” means here.  I assume that it does not mean a clear school policy prohibiting any 
discussion of ID, because only if such a policy existed would there be any need for a teacher 
to assert a First Amendment academic freedom right in the first place. 
141 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
142 Id. at 603. 
143 357 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D. N.C. 1973). 
144 393 U.S. 503 (1969).  Tinker is particularly inapposite, since it concerned the speech rights 
of the students in the school rather than the teachers. 
145 See BECKWITH, L, D & PE, supra n. 6, at 74-76. 
146 391 U.S. 563 (1968).   
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speaker is weighed against the relevant countervailing government interests) 
to speak as citizens on matters of public concern without facing 
employment-based retribution from their government employers.147  But this 
right to speak out as citizens (for example, in newspaper editorials, meetings, 
and other public forums outside the classroom) is entirely different from the 
purported right to include material or views in the classroom against the 
orders of the state, school board, or school authorities.  This latter right 
simply does not exist.  It finds no support in Supreme Court precedent, is 
contrary to existing law and common sense, would undermine the 
democratic accountability of public schools, and would cause havoc in the 
nation’s educational system.148 
 
 To begin with, the Court has never proclaimed any independent 
“academic freedom” right for public secondary school teachers or anyone 
else.  Of course, the words “academic freedom” do not appear in the First 
Amendment, or anywhere else in the Constitution, and although the phrase 
can occasionally be found in Supreme Court dicta, the Court has never 
invoked an academic freedom rationale to invalidate any government law or 
practice and has never applied it at all to protect the rights of individuals, as 
opposed to academic institutions.149  As the Fourth Circuit recently put it, 
“[T]he Supreme Court has never set aside a state regulation on the basis that 
it infringed a First Amendment right to academic freedom. . . . to the extent 
it has constitutionalized a right of academic freedom at all, [the Court] 
appears to have recognized only an institutional right of self-governance in 
academic affairs.”150 
 
 Second, the Supreme Court has not adopted, and the lower courts 
that have recently considered the issue have, for the most part, explicitly 
rejected, the notion that government employees, including public school 
teachers, have any First Amendment right to speak, in their role as employees, 
contrary to the dictates of their democratically accountable supervisors.151  In 
                                                 
147 Id. at 568.  The Pickering line of cases also includes Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), 
and United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995). 
148 See text accompanying notes 149-157, infra. 
149 For a careful explanation of why the Supreme Court’s dicta regarding academic freedom 
does not constitute any sort of holding or rule that would protect teachers in the context 
Beckwith discusses, see Malcolm M. Stewart, The First Amendment, The Public Schools, and the 
Inculcation of Community Values, 18 J. L & EDUC. 23, 59 (1989).   
150 Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 412 (4th Cir. 2000). 
151 See, e.g., Karen C. Daly, Balancing Act: Teachers’ Classroom Speech and the First Amendment, 30 J. 
L & EDUC. 1, 6 (2001) (“The Supreme Court has yet to squarely address what level of 
protection, if any, should be accorded to teachers’ in-class speech.”); id. at 18 (“From a 
practical standpoint, none of the recent circuit decisions applying Pickering have found in-
class speech to qualify as a matter of public concern.”).  For key cases, see Kirkland v. 
Northside Independent School District, 890 F.2d 794, 802 (5th Cir. 1989) (“We hold only 
that public school teachers are not free, under the first amendment, to arrogate control of 
the curricula); Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 371 (4th Cir. 1998) 
(“In the case of a public school . . . it is far better policy . . . that the makeup of the 
curriculum be entrusted to the local school authorities who are in some sense responsible, 
rather than to the teachers, who would be responsible only to the judges, had they a First 
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other words, even if a teacher may have a right to speak out as a private 
citizen in favor of ID (or drug use or Communism or any other unpopular 
idea) at a public meeting or in a newspaper editorial without fear of losing his 
or her job, the same teacher does not possess the same right to speak out on 
those same topics within the classroom, if the relevant authorities have given 
sufficiently clear notice that such topics or viewpoints are off-limits.  Again, 
the Fourth Circuit articulated this position when it explained that prior to 
determining whether the Pickering balancing test even applies to a public 
employee, the court must determine whether the employee is speaking as a 
citizen or rather in her capacity as employee:  “This focus on the capacity of 
the speaker recognizes the basic truth that speech by public employees 
undertaken in the course of their job duties will frequently involve matters of 
vital concern to the public, without giving those employees a First 
Amendment right to dictate to the state how they will do their jobs.”152 
 
 This analysis comports with common sense.  If high level 
government officials lack the power to restrict the official government 
speech of their employees, then those employees (including teachers) who 
serve as spokespersons for the state would have near-complete authority to 
countermand the state’s official messages.  The Fourth Circuit uses the 
example of an assistant district attorney at a formal press conference who 
criticizes his boss’s decision to pursue a murder charge,153 but this is only one 
of countless possible examples in which Beckwith’s rule would disrupt the 
functioning of the government.  One only has to imagine the President’s 
Press Secretary condemning the war in Iraq, an EPA scientist making an 
official statement that a particular type of pollution is far worse than the 
Administrator has recognized, or a state employment officer speaking out 
against the state’s affirmative action policies to understand the chaos of 
recognizing a First Amendment right in a subordinate speaking in his or her 
official capacity on matters of public concern.154 
 
 Recognizing this right would be just as problematic in the public 
schools as it would be elsewhere in the government.  There does not seem to 
be any principled way to limit Beckwith’s rule to the ID context, and 
Beckwith does not suggest any.  This means that teachers could teach their 
                                                                                                                                                 
Amendment right to participate in the makeup of the curriculum.”); but see Cockrel v. Shelby 
County School Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1051-52 (6th Cir. 2002) (rejecting approach of the 
Fourth and Fifth Circuits). 
152 Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 407. 
153 See id. at 407-08. 
154 For an important discussion of this issue, see Robert C. Post, Between Governance and 
Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1775 (1987) 
(“When administering its own institutions, the government is invested with a special form of 
authority, which I shall call ‘managerial.’  Managerial authority is controlled by first 
amendment rules different from those which control the exercise of the authority used by 
the state when it acts to govern the general public.”); id. at 1771-72 (using the example of a 
government subordinate who insists on presenting his position on some matter instead of 
the position that the superior has insisted be presented).  See also Stewart, supra n. 149, at 66-
68 & n. 136. 
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views on a whole array of controversial topics, with the school having no 
recourse against them whatsoever.  Teachers could supplement a sex 
education class with their own views about whether condoms actually work 
or how HIV is really transferred, suggest that the federally-funded abstinence 
lesson they just taught is a “bunch of bunk,” mention at the end of their 
health lesson that drugs are in fact “kind of fun,” hint that the evidence 
showing the existence of the Holocaust is a “bit overstated,” or argue that 
slavery was a mutually beneficial economic arrangement for whites and 
blacks alike.   
 
 Ensuring that government supervisors can control the official 
statements of their subordinates serves to promote democratic accountability 
among government decision-makers for the state’s official messages.155  
Ultimately, those who speak on the state’s behalf are speaking for its citizens, 
and those citizens ought to have some recourse if the state decides to take an 
official position that the citizens find abhorrent, offensive, or just plain 
wrong.  The electoral process provides this accountability check, but only for 
those officials at the highest level.  It would stand to reason, then, that to 
preserve accountability, those highest level officials ought to have the final 
say with regard to what messages the state will adopt.  If the courts adopted 
Beckwith’s position, then citizens would be deprived of any real power to 
hold the government accountable for its statements, in cases in which an 
employee exercises his or her First Amendment rights to make an official 
statement on a controversial issue that is contrary to the message that the 
state itself endorses.  In other words, if a public school teacher decides to 
teach that the Holocaust never happened, the community ought to be able to 
pressure the school board (or other relevant decision-making body) to stop 
the teacher from promoting this view in the classroom.  If the board can 
control the teacher’s speech, and the board agrees with the community, then 
the teacher will either stop speaking or be fired.  If the board does not want 
to reprimand the teacher, then the community can vote the relevant board 
members off of the board.  On the other hand, if the teacher has a First 
Amendment right to say what he or she wants, the community will have no 
legal or political recourse to stop the teacher from continuing to engage in 
the detested speech.156 
 
 Of course, Beckwith does not argue that a teacher has a First 
Amendment right to replace the prescribed curriculum by teaching ID theory 
                                                 
155 See Stewart, supra n. 149, at 27 (“[T]he basic principle of democratic theory is that 
decisions made by popularly-elected officials have the presumptive approval of the 
community. . . . When a court orders school officials to present in school programs messages 
which the officials have chosen not to present, it is in fact denying the majority of parents 
the right to educate their children as they see fit.”). 
156 The school or school board could presumably fire the board for appointing the teacher, 
but this would not stop the speech, and such a practice would encourage government 
employers to hire only the most non-controversial employees, when in fact, sometimes 
interesting and controversial speech can be good, so long as the employer can ultimately 
control it if it goes too far. 
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instead of evolution; rather he argues that a teacher has the right to supplement 
the existing evolution curriculum with ID theory. 157  But this distinction does 
not save the argument, because there is no reason to think that the analysis is 
any different just because the employee first says what he is supposed to say 
before putting in his own two cents.  A First Amendment rule allowing 
supplementation but not replacement would still undermine the functioning 
of government and interrupt the lines of democratic accountability.  Should 
the President’s Press Secretary really be able to say at a press conference that 
“the President believes that the war in Iraq is just, but it’s not”?  Should a 
public school teacher be able to say, “Most people believe that the Holocaust 
happened, but they are wrong,” or “the school thinks you shouldn’t have sex, 
but I think you should,” if the community strongly disagrees with these 
positions?   
 
 Finally, it is worth noting that nothing I have said here is meant to 
suggest that schools and school boards should regularly choose to restrict 
what their teachers may say or do in the classroom.  There are certainly 
strong educational arguments in favor of allowing teachers wide latitude to 
teach the material they wish in the manner they wish, even if sometimes their 
teaching methods or materials are controversial.  Providing teachers such 
leeway also sends the important message both to the community and to the 
teachers themselves that teachers are respected professionals whose work is 
incredibly important and central to the effective functioning of a democracy.  
Indeed, I would think that in the vast majority of cases, school boards should 
allow teachers vast freedom to do what they want when they are in front of 
their classes.  But this argument is based on sound educational policy, not 
constitutional law.  Saying that schools ought to allow teachers to 
supplement the curriculum with their own views in most cases is not the 
same thing as saying that teachers should have a First Amendment right to 
supplement the curriculum with their own controversial viewpoints in those 
few cases in which the community is strongly opposed to that viewpoint.  
The latter purported “right” has no basis in constitutional text or precedent 
and is contrary to common sense and the ideals of the political community. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In the next few years, it seems likely that courts will start weighing in 
on whether public schools may, consistent with the First Amendment, teach 
ID theory as an alternative to evolution.  The case currently pending in 
Pennsylvania may be the first; even if it settles or is decided on other 
grounds, there will surely be another case following soon after.  When the 
                                                 
157 See BECKWITH, L, D & PE, supra n. 6, at 76.  It is not clear, however, why Beckwith 
adopts this position as a matter of First Amendment free speech theory, since the First 
Amendment protects private parties from government compelled speech as well as 
prohibited speech.  See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (holding that 
individuals have a First Amendment right to cover up state messages on license plates); West 
Virginia State Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (finding students have a First 
Amendment right not to say the Pledge of Allegiance). 
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courts do get around to deciding this very important issue, they should 
realize that although ID may in some ways be different from the anti-
evolution iterations that have come before it, in many ways it is quite the 
same.  It is best viewed as a religious belief, and teaching it in the public 
schools as a scientific theory when it has achieved no success within the 
scientific community will likely be understood by a reasonable believer as an 
endorsement of religious belief.  Professor Beckwith has advanced some 
creative arguments in ID’s favor, and critiqued some of my own along the 
way, but these ultimately unsuccessful contentions should not distract the 
courts from  recognizing ID’s inherent constitutional infirmities. 
 
